Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of securitisation and structural changes of the Australian mortgage market on bank pricing behaviour. Since the mid 1990s, securitisation has dramatically increased and thus intensified competition between banks and mortgage corporations (new entrants). To respond to the competition, banks largely reduced their mortgage interest rates. However, there is no study on what caused their price reductions. We present a simple model to explain potential factors that may affect bank behaviour. It is the first time to examine this issue from both perspectives of cost effects and market structural changes by testing four major bank data. It finds that lender yield spreads are significantly related to bank market share, existing and new loan concentration indexes, and securitisation respectively. Findings further indicate that declined concentration and increased competition have significantly caused lender spread changes. The findings are consistent with both securitisation literature (e.g., Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Kolari et al., 1998; Ambrose et al, 2004) .) and price-concentration studies (e.g., Berger and Hannan, 1989) .
Introduction
Securitisation, also known as structured finance, represents one of the most fascinating financial innovations and capital market developments over the last three decades.
Particularly, in the wake of the recent sub-prime crisis, securitisation has attracted a widespread attention by the public, academic, regulators and any other concerned parties. Like any other financial innovations, it brings some unique benefits and potential problems as well. This paper, from an alternative perspective, is to examine the impact on bank pricing behaviour in Australia.
Mortgage securitisation, more recently in Australia, plays an increasing role in mortgage finance, having a dramatic growth after 1997 particularly. Total securitisation outstanding surged from AU$ 2.05 billion in December 1988 to AU$
billion in December 2003
1 . Mortgage securitisation is the largest contributor for the increase, from AU$ 1.303 billion to AU$ 105.97 billon. This market ranked second to USA in size. Australian mortgage markets differ from USA in several ways.
Since the earlier 1990s, mortgage corporations 2 have been active, becoming major players in the securitisation market eventually. The Australian primary market is also quite unique. Four major commercial banks 3 have traditionally dominated the market, with around 60% of market share of own-occupied home loans in 1994, and had some declines in recent years. More interestingly, nearly 80 percent of Australian mortgages are originated with adjustable rates. Any reductions in interest rate, therefore, have a greater impact on borrowers' costs because not only existing loans but also newlyoriginated ones are more sensitive to any rate adjustments.
Since the early 1990s, securitisation has enabled mortgage corporations to establish in Australia and to securitise their loans (nearly 100%) in both the domestic and global capital markets for raising cheaper funds and then lending them to borrowers. The whole recycling process allows them to grow quickly and compete with the traditional lenders, such as commercial banks, by providing cheaper and new products (currently about 2,000 products in the market). As a result, for instance, the bank market share of We borrow ideas from economic literature on the relationship of price setting behaviour, and competition and concentration. For example, the price-concentration research 4 considers market concentration as exogenous factors to bank pricing behaviour and suggests that high concentration allows for non-competitive behaviour that leads to less favourable prices to consumers (e.g., Berger and Hannan, 1989) . Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) strongly support the idea that potential entrants encounter a greater difficulty to access to credit in a concentrated banking market than in a competitive market. With this sense in mind, without securitisation funding, mortgage corporations could not exist, and thus the banking market would remain at a high degree of concentration as before.
Because little empirical research on this issue can be found, particularly in an Australian context, this paper attempts to fill the gap and thus makes several contributions to literature. This motivates us to further investigate the issue. It should be the first to examine the impact of securitisation on bank pricing behaviour in both cost reduction and competition perspectives as previous literature has not directly addressed the market structural change due to securitisation. It also is the first work to examine the dynamic relation between lender spread changes and concentration, competition and securitisation.
To address the above mentioned research problem, firstly, we use a simple model to illustrate how the possible factors may affect bank pricing behaviour. After that, regression and Granger Causality tests are used to examine monthly data of standard adjustable rate mortgages (SARMs) of the four major banks between 1994 and 2003.
We collectively follow methodologies that are used in securitisation research (e.g. Black et al 1981; Kolari et al, 1998; Naranjo and Toevs, 2002; Ambrose et al, 2004) and price-concentration studies (e.g. Berger and Hannan, 1989; Corvoisier and Gropp, 2002) .
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on cost effects associated with securitisation, and banking concentration and pricing behaviour. Section 3 discusses the basic model pertaining to the research problem, describes data and defines variables that are used for model tests. Section 4
reports empirical results and discusses the findings. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
Two broad aspects of securitisation 5 , both theoretical and empirical, are reviewed, which are considered to be most relevant to our research problem. The existing empirical work with respect to securitisations' effects on mortgage costs also is summarised. In addition, price-concentration literature with regard to bank pricing settings is briefly covered.
Potential benefits of securitisation
Liquidity research predicts a direct effect of securitisation on bank liquidity risk and marketability, as well as the market as a whole. Berger and Udell (1993) state that banks with high loan sales volume have superior ability to securitise their remaining assets compared to low sales banks. Therefore, securitisation activity is negatively associated with liquidity risk. Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) suggest that the banking industry as a whole is more liquid with the growth of loan sales.
There are at least four dimensions relating to liquidity:
1. Overall mortgage marketability and liquidity are improved through securitisation (e.g., Black et al., 1981; Gorton and, Pennacchi, 1995; Kothari, 2006) ; 2. The process of securitisation change the nature of assets (e.g., Schwarcz, 1994; Hill, 1997) , transforming illiquid assets (e.g., mortgages) into marketable securities;
3. Security designs with pooling and tranching enhance asset liquidity (e.g., DeMarzo, 2005) , reallocating cash flows, risks and information;
4. Banks' liquidity positions are strengthened (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1993; Thomas and Wang, 2003) .
Funding cost studies (e.g., Hill, 1997; Schwarcz, 1994; Iacobucci and Winter, 2005) suggest that securitisation's purpose is to low funding costs for the firm by separating the originator's receivables via securitisation from its associated risks. It effectively alters the approach of the credit rating from a company based to an asset based as the asset's ownership is legally separated from its originators. Thus the originator can then use these assets to raise funds in the capital markets at a lower cost than by directly issuing more of its own debts or equity.
Researchers (e.g., Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987; Cumming, 1987; Pennacchi, 1988; Wolfe, 2000) support the view that securitisation banks can reduce their reserve, capital requirements and deposit insurance premium 6 , known as "regulatory tax".
Some other authors (e.g., Hess and Smith 1988) indicate that securitisation can be used as an asset and liability tool to manage credit risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, prepayment risk and portfolios for financial institutions.
Furthermore, Hill (1997) and Gorton and Souleles (2005) predict that Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) in securitisation helps reduce bankruptcy costs. Hill (1997) and Iacobucci and Winter (2005) suggest that securitisation process can help reduce information cost and an asymmetric information problem between the investors (as lenders) and the company (as borrowers). Securitisation can solve the 'lemon problem' when the company faces financing difficulties and then reduce information costs about company's receivables. In addition, some studies (e.g. Iacobucci and Winter, 2005) suggest that securitisation can lower agency costs and underinvestment problems.
Empirical evidence
The above mentioned cost effects in theory (to the originator and the market as a whole) are reflected in mortgage costs. Empirical work of securitisation on yield spreads or rates follows two broad approaches. The first approach (e.g., Black et al., 1980; Kolari et al., 1998) uses series data to test effects of securitisation over time.
Their results generally support the view that the growth of MBS markets in terms of improved marketability and liquidity significantly affects mortgage costs. For, example, Kolari et al. (1998) and Naranjo and Toevs (2002) who use multivariate cointegration to test the U.S. fixed rate mortgage (FRM) yield spreads find a long term relation of securitisation to yield spreads, but do not find the relation of default risk to the spreads. Kolari et al. find that 10 percent of increase in securitisation leads to a decrease of 20 basis points in the yield spreads.
Besides testing the influence of GSEs' activities on mortgage market yields, Naranjo and Toevs (2002) further examine:
1. the yield differences between conforming and non-conforming loans;
2. the spillover effects of GSEs' purchase on non-conforming loans because both types of mortgage loans are originated in a single market, in terms of investor substitutions;
3. volatility of mortgage interest rates.
They find that increased GESs' activities and securitisation reduce the yield spreads of both conforming-and non-conforming loans, narrow the differences between the two types of loans (lender yield spreads), as well as stabilise interest rates over time.
The second approach uses lenders or loans level data to investigate securitisation's effects on originator pricing behaviour (e.g., Hendershott and Shilling, 1989; Benjamin et al., 1994; Ambrose et al, 2004; Liu and Skully, 2005) . Using different U.S. datasets they consistently find that mortgage banks that securitise their assets have lower mortgage rates or spreads than depository institutions. Liu and Skully, using Australian cross-sectional data, generate the similar findings.
Market structure and bank pricing behaviour

Structural change in the mortgage market
More interestingly, securitisation promotes not only specialisation, but also competition in mortgage lending, such as the growth of mortgage banks in the USA and mortgage corporations in Australia. One of the most interesting trends is that increasing market share is held by mortgage banks as non-depository institutions.
As mortgage corporations grows quickly in Australia, O'Connell (1997, p.8) states:
"banks have already met this challenge of real competition in the housing mortgage market … mortgage originators have opened up competition and have challenged the banking industry to cut margins and profits in home lending, ultimately for the benefits of consumers." Kumar and Ralston (1999) concludes that the increase in mortgage managers' market share from 1992 to 1996 can be attributed to factors underlying the competitive advantages of competitive pricing and securitised funding. Without securitisation they would be very difficult for mortgage corporations to have entered the Australian market, as constrained by deposits and the regulatory regime. They suggest that securitisation has caused the market structural change in terms of declined concentration held by traditional banks.
Market concentration and bank pricing behaviour
There are two main explanations for the changes of mortgage yield spreads of individual banks or the industry as a whole:
1 markup theory (e.g. Rousseas, 1985) 2 the price-concentration relationship (e.g. Berger and Hannan, 1989) .
Both are related to competition and pricing in a specific banking area (i.e. the degree of oligopoly or any other barriers to entry), such as mortgages, credit cards or business lending. 7 (1985) uses the markup theory to model the pricing of bank loans i = k(u), where i is the interest rate on loan, k the degree of monopoly or market power exercised by individual banks, or in the aggregate, by the banking industry as a whole and the u the unit prime or variable costs incurred by banks.
Rousseas
Some studies apply structure-performance theory to the banking price-setting (priceconcentration relationship) (e.g. Gilbert, 1984 8 ; Berger and Hannan, 1989 Corvoisier and Gropp, 2002) . This approach assumes market structure, as an exogenous factor, impacts on bank pricing behaviour. They found a positive relationship between bank concentration (less competitive behaviour) and credit price. In more concentrated market banks will price their loans and deposits less favourable to consumers.
In summary, the above-mentioned research motivates us to reconsider the possible impacts of securitisation on bank pricing behaviour in two ways. Securitisation might have reduced originators' mortgage costs through improved mortgage marketability and liquidity. This is reflected in narrowed yield spreads or margin costs. At the same time, securitisation might have caused the structural change of the mortgage market, and the shift, in turn, might have affected bank pricing behaviour. This is demonstrated in the yield spreads too. However, no empirical study addresses the second issue.
Methodology and data
Simple model for lender yield spreads
For simplicity, this section presents the simple model to explain lender yield spread and its relationships with explanatory variables. According to the theoretical and empirical work on securitisation's cost effects detailed in the previous literature, Australian lenders can broadly be modelled into three groups: total deposit originators (TSOs), partial securitisation originators (PSOs) and total securitisation originators (TSOs) 9 . According to the securitisation literature, TDOs have the highest average unit cost while TSOs have the lowest one. PSOs are placed in the middle. C d is assumed to be the average unit cost for TDOs, C ds for PSOs and C s for TSOs, respectively, and thus
Rousseas (1985) assumes that the endogenous factor, lenders' funding costs, determine their price. Lending interest rates are based on their costs of funds. Interest rate spreads are needed to achieve their profit goal. The interest rate spread (also known as the margin or markup) is the difference between a banks' funding costs and what a bank charges on loans. In Rousseas's study the lender requires just a normal return (R n ) 10 , which is also assumed constant over time. Thus, the excess return (R ex   ) would be zero in a competitive market. The studies (e.g., Sirmans and Benjamin, 1990) predict that, in a competitive market, the excess return on assets should be nearly zero ).
In addition to the markup theory, the price-concentration literature (e.g., Berger and Hannan, 1989; Corvoisier and Gropp, 2002) suggests the excess return (R ex ) is not zero in a less competitive and more concentrated market. Market concentration and competition are regarded as exogenous factors to lender pricing-settings. For example, banks will tend to price their loans and deposits less favourably to consumers when operating in a concentrated market (e.g., Berger and Hannan, 1989 The following equations (1 to 5) help to explain the impact of securitisation and the market structural change on lender yield spreads. Equation 1 is derived for the interest rate when considering both components (costs and returns):
Where r = interest rate, C = average unit cost, i for TDOs , PSOs and TSOs, R for return rate, n for normal and ex for excess.
Thus for banks as a whole, b, either TDO or PSO
For mortgage corporations as a whole, m for TSO
When further assuming that the normal return for banks and mortgage corporations is the same: R b n = R m n . When Eqs. (2) subtracts Eqs. (3), we derive lender spreads as follow:
Where LSP = (r b -r m ) is the lender spreads between banks and mortgage corporations.
Because mortgage corporations, fully funded through securitisation, are new entrants in the market, they need to survive and compete with traditional lenders so their excess return is reasonably assumed to be close to zero, R m ex ≈ 0. Similarly, Kumar and Ralston (1999) do not find a positive relationship between mortgage corporations' yield spreads and their market share.
Therefore, Eqs. (4) can be rewritten as: Table 1 ).
In addition, based on securitisation-liquidity literature (e.g., Black et al 1981; Gorton and Haubrich, 1995; Kolari et al, 1998) , the growth of the securitisation market helps improve overall mortgage marketability. The average unit cost for banks, C b , declines, associated with the growth of the securitisation market and major banks' direct securitisation involvements as banks moved from TDOs to PSOs since 1997.
Alternatively, commercial banks may view the increased securitisation market as disintermediation signalling more competition to come so that securitisation may have spillover effects on bank pricing behaviour, also demonstrated in LSP. Naranjo and Toevs (2002) find the spillover effect on jumbo loans in U.S. According to these two explanations, LSP is expected to have a negative relation to the growth of securitisation.
Furthermore, this paper that examines lender yield spreads (LSP), rather than yield spreads over a market index, could more accurately reflect the impact of securitisation and the market structure on bank pricing behaviour. Because banks and mortgage corporations operate in the same market, C b and C m consist of the same level of market prepayment risk, market default risk premium and other risks (see Black, et al, 1981; Kolari et al., (1998) and market interest rates (e.g., 90-day bank bill rates) at a time. (C b -C m ) = ∆C will cancel out all these common cost factors and the remainder that is the lender idiosyncratic risk and cost is more relevant to securitisation and market structural factors. Therefore, lender spreads, LSP, may more sensitively relate to market concentration and competition, as well as securitisation. This will specifically examine the impact of securitisation and market structural change on lender pricing behaviour and then address the research problem. Variables that are used for testing models in the next section are summarised in Table 1 . Lender spreads (LSP) are monthly standard adjustable interest rates differences between banks and mortgage corporations for the research period. In the OLS regression models, lender spreads (LSP) is the interest rates difference between each of the four major banks' rates and average mortgage corporations' rates (as a benchmark rate) at time t. In the Causality model, it is the interest rates difference between their average rates at time t. Market concentration is proxied by two [Insert Table 1 about here]
Data description and variables definitions
Regression on lender yield spreads
The following generic regression ( 
Granger Causality test
This paper also uses the Granger Causality test 16 to examine the dynamic relationship of a pair of series, lender spreads (LSP) with securitisation (SECTZ), concentration (HHIa and HHIb) and competition (BIMSa and BIMSb) respectively. If series data are stationary, or I(0) from both the ADF and PP unit root tests, the Granger Causality test is:
Where Y t is the spreads of banks over mortgage corporations (lender spreads, LSP) at the time t; X t is the securitisation (SECTZ), concentration indexes (HHIa and HHIb) and bank industry market share (BIMSa and BIMSb) respectively; α y and α x are the intercepts; ε y,t and ε x,t are the white noise error terms; β and λ are the parameters of the lagged value Y and X respectively.
If a level series is non-stationary, I(1) based on ADF and PP tests, as suggests, a series will be converted into an I(0) by using its first difference: ∆Y t is the first difference of lender spreads at the time t; ∆X t is the first difference of the securitisation, concentration index and market share at the time t respectively.
The test of causality is based on the F-statistic through estimating expressions in both restricted and unrestricted forms (see . It can be expressed as the following;
Where SSE and SSE UR are the residual sum of squares of the restricted and unrestricted models respectively; T denotes the number of observations; m stands for the number of lags. The F-statistic follows a χ 2 /m distribution.
Empirical results and discussions
Regression results for lender spreads
This section reports on regression results of lender yield spreads using the four models separately, as shown Tables 2 and 3. In Panel A of Table 2 , lender spreads for the four major banks are positively associated with their market shares (BMS) at the 1 percent level of significance, but negatively with the growth of securitisation at the same level.
[Insert Table 2 [Insert Table 3 about here]
We further examine whether trends (via year) have any impacts on their spreads. As shown in Table 3 Therefore, the above findings are consistent with securitisation literature (e.g., Black et al, 1981; Kolari et al, 1998) and price-concentration studies (e.g., Berger and Hannan, 1989) . Without the growth of mortgage securitisation, it would be impossible that to some extent, the dominated position of the four major banks was challenged and weakened in the primary mortgage market.
Granger Causality test for lender yield spreads
This section reports results on the dynamic relationship between lender yield spreads and market concentration, competition and securitisation. The Granger Causality test is used to examine whether the first difference of competition, concentration and marketability has respectively caused the first difference of lender yield spreads (∆LSP) for the research period 17 and vice versa.
Causality relationships in F-statistics are presented in Table 4 . As shown in Panel A of Table 4 , the first four variables in their first difference (∆BIMSa, ∆BIMSb, ∆HHIa and ∆HHIb) independently cause the change of lender spreads (∆LSP) in the first two lags, with the F-statistic at equal to or below the 0.05 level of significance. The new loan concentration index (∆HHIb) is still significant to ∆LSP across all the six lags.
These results suggest that declined market concentration and increased competition caused lender spreads narrowed.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
However, as shown in Panel B of Table 4 , the first difference of lender spreads (∆LSP) do not cause all the first four variables (∆BIMSa, ∆BIMSb, ∆HHIa and ∆HHIb) in all the six lags respectively, except for the new loan concentration (∆HHIb) and securitisation (∆SECTZ) in the first lag (at 0.05 level). The finding indicates that there is no feedback relation.
The above findings further suggest the increased competition and declined concentration in the mortgage market have impacted on changes of lender yield spreads. This further is consistent with the price-concentration literature (e.g., Berger and Hannan, 1989; Corvoisier and Gropp, 2002) , and Australian research (e.g., Kumar and Ralston, 1999; O'Connell, 1997) .
Similarly, marketability (∆SECTZ) in Panel A also significantly causes the spread in the first two lags (at the 0.5 level). This suggests that improved mortgage marketability and liquidity may also affect the spreads. This is also consistent with securitisationrelated literature (e.g., Black et al, 1981; Kolari et al, 1998; Ambrose et al, 2004) . In addition, securitisation may have a spillover effect on lender spreads because all lenders operate in the same market, evidenced in Narano and Toevs (2002) . Thus, securitisation may also impact on bank pricing behaviour. literature (e.g., Gorton and Haubrich, 1995; Kolari et al, 1998) and price-concentration studies (e.g., Berger and Hannan, 1989) . Thirdly, Granger Causality findings further indicate the increased competition and declined concentration in the mortgage market led to narrowed lender spreads in terms of adjusting prices by banks to the changing market condition. Improved overall mortgage marketability and liquidity may also have an impact on changes of lender yield spreads. This is also consistent with securitisation-related literature (e.g., Black et al, 1981; Kolari et al, 1998; Narano and Toevs, 2002; Ambrose et al, 2004) .
In summary, securitisation has affected lender spreads through changing the mortgage market structure and improving mortgage marketability and liquidity. The findings suggest that securitisation is a key driver to narrowed lender spreads for the period from 1994 to 2003. This is an important finding because previous literature has not directly tested securitisation's exogeneity to lender spreads in terms of bank pricing behaviour. Therefore, these findings provide new evidence on the effects of securitisation.
Australian borrowers are more sensitive to any reductions of interest rates (or costs) because majority of home loans are originated with adjustable rates. The findings provide a very important economic and policy implication for banking regulators and policymakers with respect to improving competition for mortgage lending and mortgage market liquidity. The above results suggest that the heightened competition and declined concentration, and improved mortgage liquidity bring great benefits to borrowers in terms of cost savings so banking regulators and policymakers should continue their efforts to further improve them. However, one may argue that the increased competition may also drive lenders to relax their credit standards, such as low documentation loans in Australia and sub-prime mortgages in USA. Therefore banking regulators need to closely regulate and monitor lending practices at the same time as these three aspects should be treated to be equally important to a healthy and sustainable banking system. Further research on this topic may also examine lender credit practices and regulations. Where LSP is the spreads of four major banks over mortgage corporations for the period from January 1994 to December 2002; SECTZ; BMS, monthly market share of each of four major bank; SECTZ, marketability and liquidity change via annual growth rate of overall mortgage securitisation; HHIa for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of residential loan outstanding as a measure of concentration; HHIb for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the newly originated residential loan as a another measure of concentration. Note: → denotes the direction of Granger Causality. The following regressions are used as:
∆Y is the first difference of the spreads of banks over mortgage corporations at time; ∆X is the first difference of market share, concentration index and marketability respectively. Where, ∆ denotes first difference; LSP stands for spreads of banks over mortgage corporations from January 1994 to December 2003; BIMSa for banks' market share of the residential mortgage market; BIMSb for banks' newly originated market share of residential loans; HHIa for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of residential loan outstanding as a measure of concentration; HHIb for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the newly originated residential loan as a another measure of concentration; and, SECTZ, the growth of securitisation, proxying for overall mortgage market marketability and liquidity.
a, b and c denotes the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of significance respectively.
